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Abstract:
Britain is one of the top conventional weapons suppliers in the world; it appears to be devoted to ensuring transparency and accountability in such exports. The Scott Report of 1996, an enquiry into weapon supplies to Iraq and Iran in the early 1980s, came up with various criticisms and recommendations, most importantly the need for greater transparency and parliamentary accountability on arms sales. This article enquires into the role of parliament in scrutinising the government and ensuring accountability in arms trading, with emphasis on the role of the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls, the progress made since the Inquiry in this area and the strengths and challenges of the UK practices on the issue.

ACCORDING to the Swedish Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), ten UK arms industries constitute among the top 100 arms producing companies in the world which belong to nineteen countries. In the year 2005 alone these (UK) industries sold 34.2b USD worth armaments, which covered 11.8 per cent of the total arms sales made by all the top (world) industries mentioned earlier.​[1]​  Whilst they are vital for equipping the British armed forces and other domestic law enforcement bodies with weapons and weapon technologies, their main business is export dependent. A ten years (1997-2007) SIPRI data of the top fifty arms exporter countries placed the UK number five in the list, preceded by USA, Russia, France and Germany, and followed by countries such as The Netherlands, Ukraine, Italy and China.​[2]​ 
 Despite the uncertainty on this ranking of Britain (due to the secretive nature of the transactions universally), this export led arms business poses human security​[3]​ and constitutional concerns at home and abroad. Issues of transparency (which is contrary to secrecy) and parliamentary oversight on policies and actions of the executive​[4]​ emerge in view of ensuring compliance with legal/policy and ethical standards of international and national nature, applicable to arms supplies to other jurisdictions. 
    This is why parliament has long been trying to oversee arms export decisions and practices even before Scott Reported in 1996. Various methods (of scrutiny) and endeavours of parliament in the late 1980s and early 1990s could show both the merits and limits of such controls. As a result of the controversial British arms sales to Iraq and Iran in the 1980s (when both countries were at war with each other), MPs were questioning ministers in the floor of the House (of Commons) to explain the legitimacy of these exports and related issues. But, ministers were refusing, reluctant and at times ‘close to lying’ in (fully and clearly) responding to arms sales related questions.​[5]​  These problems were caused not only because of the power of ministers to deny or release information to parliament (see Hunt), but also because of other twofold factors: on the one hand, the fact that most backbenchers ‘were naturally reluctant to criticise their own government…those on the government backbenchers best equipped to ask questions have a vested interest in not doing so. A number of Conservative MPs have close links with the defence industries. These links range from directorships of defence companies to close links with people involved in defence companies’ (as argued by Phythiam and Little, p 296). On the other hand, the Opposition (Labour) back and front benchers ‘generally lack the information necessary’ to attack and challenge the Conservative government of the time. Yet the Opposition was putting general pressure on the government. In January 1992, for example, Gordon Brown, concerning the Supergun affair (a matter elaborated later), asserted that ‘[C]oming after the new revelations of Iraq’s strength in nuclear and other technologies and the scale and extend of British involvement in exports to Iraq, it is now time for the Prime Minister to come clean’.​[6]​   
    Similarly, written answers to parliamentary questions were also used to challenge arms exports to Saddam Hussein and others. ‘In 1989 the Labour MP Marjorie Mowlam asked what the investigations the Department of Trade and Industry had undertaken into Matrix Churchill’ allegations. Yet ‘the reply was that: “All export licence applications are examined carefully. I have no reason to believe that the company contravened UK export regulations”’(Phythiam and Little). Scott, in his assessment of government replies to written queries of MPs, further articulated the problem, by saying that constituencies were asking their respective MPs about government arms sales policy and practice to the then repressive regime of Iraq and to the Middle East (d 4. 1). Replies of government were inaccurate and very brief   (d.4.3 - d.4.4).​[7]​
   In contrast to, the role of Select Committees (SCs) was generally perceived as ‘far better suited both to establishing facts and critically analysing policy than any thing that may take place on the floor of either House’  (Leigh et al, 59).  The Trade and Industry Select Committee’s (TISC) investigations on both the Supergun and BMARC controversies may support this. In 1991-92,  in respect of the Supergun affair,  the TISC ‘inquired into a tangled web of events between 1988 and 1990, which ended with the detention of eight huge steel tubes at Teesport and the arrest of a number of people involved. The Committee's conclusions were critical of several aspects of the performance of DTI's Export Control Organisation (ECO)’.​[8]​  The TISC also published a report in June 1996 on ‘export licensing’ involving an arms company called BMARC, ‘following a debate in June 1995 in which the allegations of diversion to Iran of naval cannon exported by BMARC to Singapore in the late 1980s’. The Report critically examined export licensing procedures and the problems therein.​[9]​
   Despite these and other similar efforts, the role of SCs (and the TISC) was compounded by a range of problems: first, they were fully government departments’ reliant with respect to access to evidence and document. The nature of this problem ranges from deliberate denial (or deception) of information by officials to systemic failings of departments to appropriately document events and transactions. In the Supergun affair, for instance, officials were prevented from providing evidence to the Committee, and the executive was not willing to fully and honestly provide its policies (such as the guidelines for arms exports) to the TISC. In the BMRAC inquiry there were serious problems concerning finding documents from relevant departments of government. SC’s were not equipped with adequate power to overcome this and related challenges, other than trying to secure cooperation from authorities. The restriction on the extent to which civil servants may testify before SCs (was knows as the ‘Osmotherly rules’) was also a bar to the work of SCs.
    Secondly, SCs were facing resource and time constraints in the course of addressing such complex issues. Again, the 1991-92 inquiry offers a good example here. Initially, the TISC began to look at the British arms supply to Iraq in general but later limited itself into the Supergun affair. Even in this Inquiry, the committee was not that critical of departments. Finally, questions of impartiality, commitment, and skill of members of SCs may also arise​[10]​ in handling these politically and economically sensitive cases.
   This pre-Scott brief assessment indicates that parliament and its various methods of scrutiny (especially the TISC) were useful in controlling the executive’s actions and omissions on matters of arms sales. However, due to lack of power, resources and conducive policy and legal framework, the endeavours were generally weak. The executive was also much powerful than parliament (and its SCs) in terms of power to deny or permit evidence, to answer questions, and to formulate policies and regulations. 
  This may lead one to ask, inter alia: as to what the political and constitutional connotations of these problems can be, their possible remedies, whether it was necessary to introduce new legal and policy framework (s), and as to where we are now. The Scott Report of 1996 may offer notable (if not absolute) answers to the first three questions, which will ultimately lead to addressing the last point.      

The Scott Report and Relevant Recommendations. 

The Scott Inquiry was linked to the Iran-Iraq war fought in the 1980s. During this period the United Kingdom supplied weapons to both countries, Iran and Iraq, despite the fact that the official policy was that of neutrality.  In the late 1990s the press and parliament began raising questions about the legitimacy of these supplies. After the collapse of the Matrix Churchill criminal case, in which three business men had been accused of illegal sales of machine tools to Iraq, the controversy (over such arms supplies) led to the announcement by government of the institution of ‘full and independent inquiry’ into the matter in November 1992. In his inquiry Scott looked, among others, at: whether arms or machine tools’ had been exported to Iraq in contravention of official national policy; and whether the government had been complicit in the contraventions; and whether parliament had been misled over the affair.​[11]​  
    The most relevant conclusions of the Report were: (1) the government failed to comply with one of the core constitutional principles relating to ministerial accountability in that ‘there is to be found…, a constant undervaluing by government of the public interest that full information should be made available to parliament’(d.1.165); (2) withholding information from the people ‘constitutes an avoidance, and some times an evasion, pro tanta, of Ministerial accountability’ (d.4.56); and (3) there was a ‘variance between government statements of policy and government's actual policy’ (d.4. 53).  Scott’s critique was carefully fashioned and fully appreciative of the fact that certain information such as on going operations of the security services can be withheld in the interests of the public (d.4. 56). 
   The central and perhaps the most important recommendation of Scott was that ministers  

have a duty to explain in Parliament the exercise of their powers and duties and to give an account to Parliament of what is done by them in their capacity as Ministers or by their departments. This includes the duty to give Parliament, including its Select Committees, and the public as full information as possible about the policies, decisions and actions of the Government, and not to deceive or mislead Parliament and the public (d. 4. 57; Tomkins, 25-49). 

This has to be the case ‘whether in answering PQs, or in a debate’ of parliament. He emphatically mentioned that ‘the withholding of information by an accountable Minister should never be based on reasons of convenience or for avoidance of political embarrassment and should always require special and strong justification’ (d.4.58).
    The Report (and the proposed solutions) generated both positive reactions and some disappointments. Lustgarten submitted that the Scott Report ‘has provided a baseline for popular judgement, a platform for critique and, by implication at least, an outline of standards for how the political… elite which governs the nation ought to behave’.​[12]​ To Phythian, moreover, the Inquiry ‘has turned the spotlight on the role played by the British government in the international arms trade during the 1980s, fuelling the debates on transparency, accountability and oversight as well as on the question of the ethics of supplying arms to authoritarian or warring states generally’.​[13]​ 
    Yet, Leigh and Lustgarten have expressed their disappointment on the Report for not adequately addressing crucial constitutional mechanisms and remedies such as the establishment of an independent ‘information tribunal’, to help parliament and the public in their effort to oversee secretive Executive actions on arms supplies.​[14]​  Phythian raised the question whether the Report ‘represent a missed opportunity’ regarding the arms trade, as ‘it is often treated as little more than the context within which an inquiry into how we are really governed has been undertaken’. Much emphasis on administrative and procedural issues as opposed to policy and substantive matters of arms export appeared to have led to such dissatisfactions. 
  While the principal claim of Scott that government is duty-bound to fully inform parliament on matters of arms export, but withhold information under exceptional circumstances was generally commended,​[15]​  he did not explore the usual exceptions to such a principle inter alia concerns of national security, foreign policy and commercial confidentiality, the polemics of which is not within the scope of this article. 
     Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that, despite its shortcomings and criticisms, Lord Scott’s Report lied a foundation on which a transparent and accountable arms export regime could be build and the role of parliamentary oversight be enhanced. Whether his proposal came into fruition will be examined next, in the context of the parliamentary reforms carried out by Labour beginning late 1990s.  
  
  Responses of the Blair Government. 

‘Renewing Parliament’ was one of the central mottos of Labour and the Liberal Democrats in the run-up to the 1997 general election, the main focus of which was to modernise the House of Commons in areas like ‘better use of MPs’ time’, making PM Question Time ‘more genuine and serious means of holding the government to account’, enhancing SCs’ role ‘in ensuring the accountability of departments’ and the promotion of transparency on decisions of the government.​[16]​  After Labour took office in 1997, a Ministerial Code (which was deduced from a parliamentary resolution) was introduced by Prime Minister Tony Blair incorporating the principles that ministers are accountable for their policies, actions and the activities of their departments and agencies, that they should be open and honest to parliament, etc. 
  Steps were also taken to modernise the function and effectiveness of SCs. Oliver summarised (some of) the developments, saying:​[17]​

 these committees now have an agreed, explicit set of core objectives, extending beyond imposing direct ministerial responsibility more effectively, to tasks such as monitoring performance against targets in public service agreements, taking evidence from independent regulators and inspectorates, considering the reports of Executive Agencies….   

The government also endorsed the duty to respond to their reports. The reports of SCs have been vital in effecting changes in various sectors of government since 1997. Yet the process was not without problems: there were delays in realising the (modernisation) programmes, although this may vary from committee to committee. The usual questions on SCs such as lack of power, effectiveness, resources, etc) have not been fully addressed. The performance of SCs varies depending on the strengths and weaknesses of their chairs and members, the cooperation they get from government departments, civil societies and even experts, as considered later. It is noteworthy that the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was a positive step towards improving transparency and accountability in Britain.
   Similar changes occurred in the arms export controls’ field. Following the Scott Report, the government published a White Paper on Strategic Export Controls​[18]​ which led to the adoption of the Export Control Act 2002 (ECA).​[19]​  Schedule 5 (2) made it clear that (direct or indirect) impacts of arms exports inter alia on UK and other countries’ security, and the respect for human rights and humanitarian law, may result in the restriction of their authorisation. As covered by s9 (3) and (8) of the Act, the government shall treat ‘The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria of October 2000’ as guidance and ‘general principles’, when exercising licensing powers.​[20]​ The criteria incorporated regional (EU) standards applicable to arms transfer including the impact of arms sales on the sustainable development efforts of developing countries. In addition to setting out the substantive criteria, and unlike previous legislation, s10 (1) (b) of the ECA requires the executive to report to parliament on ‘matters relating to the operation of this Act (and any order made under it) during the year’. 
   In fact, the government has, from 1997 until the present, published national annual strategic export control reports, including authorised, refused or revoked licence applications. The reports, according to the government​[21]​ 

explain the policy on arms exports and the thinking behind our policy. It gives details - by destination - both of physical exports and of what equipment has been licensed for export. 
It is part of fulfilling our commitment to transparent and responsible arms exports.

Since 2004, the government has also been issuing quarterly reports. The contents of both the annual and quarterly reports are similar to that of the reports submitted to parliament and its committees, as considered separately. Similar reports are also submitted to the European Union. It is interesting to note that Jack Straw, Hilary Benn, John Reid and Alan Johnson, in their Annular Report for 2004 on Strategic Exports said: ‘[W]e remain committed to making our licensing decisions and policy as open as possible, enabling parliament and the public to hold us to account’.​[22]​ 





BACKGROUND. Generally, PQs, written answers, parliamentary debates and the works of SCs are important features of parliamentary oversight. This section will focus on the role of SCs (the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports in particular), taking into account the (relatively) unique developments and the challenges in this area. This is not withstanding that PQs and written questions and answers on matters of arms transactions are of significant importance to hold the executive to account as emphasised by Scott (d 1.165). And in recent times, officials are more open and ready to explain (in both oral and written answers) the policy reasons and procedures for arms sales even to specific destinations,​[23]​ as opposed to pre-Scott era. 
    The picture is somewhat different when questions of disclosing specific information arise. The April 2007 session offers a good example. Mr. Moore MP asked the Secretary of FCO ‘if she will place in the Library a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Saudi Arabia on the sale of Euro fighter aircraft, signed in December 2005’. The reply was: ‘No. This document is confidential between the two governments. I am withholding the information as it would, or would be likely to prejudice international relations and harm the interests of the United Kingdom.’​[24]​  
    While it is difficult to comment on whether the reply was right or wrong (as this piece is not meant to address FoI questions), such extremely brief replies are good reminders of how the Conservative government used (or abused) them to avert accountability not long ago, as considered above. Bearing in mind the limited time given to MPs and the greater discretion ministers enjoy in deciding on what should and should not be disclosed, therefore, PQs and written answers do not seem, even today, to provide adequate information to parliament and the public (as duly considered by Payper and Oliver). 
    SCs have been, however, the most effective tools of executive scrutiny, though not without shortcomings. They are ‘supposed to act as some sort of a check on the actions of the executive’.​[25]​ The Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Development select committees deal with matters of arms export. While Scott did not essentially cover them in his Inquiry (although he underscored that ministers and civil servants should give full evidence to select committees), commentators (including Leigh et al) seem to generally agree that they are much better in ‘establishing facts and analysing polices’ than the rest of methods of (parliamentary) scrutiny.  For example, in 1998, the Foreign Affairs Committee ‘subjected the foreign secretary and his officials to aggressive questioning over the government’s involvement in arms supplies—in  breach of a UN arms embargoes to Sierra Leone’.​[26]​  Likewise, in 1999, the Trade and Industry Committee ‘accused the government of a systematic failure to respect human rights concerns by promoting the sale of arms to repressive foreign regimes’. 
  Yet government secrecy and the inherent reliance of their work on the will of officials to disclose arms trade related information continued to affect their performance. The government was resistant to disclose full information to SCs, as considered further. This showed the gap between achieving office and fulfilling the promises on transparency and parliamentary accountability (as discussed above) by the Labour government.  There were concerns of leaks of information to the Executive as well.​[27]​  These and related concerns seem to have led to further progress in the field, a systematic examination of which will offer perhaps a good understanding on where we are now.

THE QUDRIPARTITE COMMITTEE. Drastic institutional and substantive developments have been recorded since 1999 in this area; the four Select Committees referred above formed a joint committee namely ‘Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls’ (it was recently renamed ‘The Committees on Arms Export Controls’), chaired by Roger Berry MP),​[28]​ with the purpose of integrating and maximising their efforts to scrutinise the reports and practices of the government at issue. The government fully supported this development.
   In February 2000, the Quadripartite Committee (hereafter ‘the Committee’) ‘reported to the House on the 1997 and 1998 Annual Reports’ of the government on strategic export controls—this was the first joint report of the Committee. This practice of scrutiny (which is retrospective in nature) continued until today, the emphasis, style and content of which evolved from time to time. The published reports of the Committee (including on the web) contain not only its own assessments but also the details of oral and written evidences collected and replies of government to its findings.​[29]​  The nature of the reports of the Committee can further be deduced, for instance, from the Second Joint Report of 2002-03. The Committee investigated, inter alia, 

individual cases arising from the 2001 Annual Report, both where we can give reassurance that licences have been properly granted and where we continue to have concerns,  more general policy issues, the format and content of the Government’s Annual Reports, and  the administration of the licensing system​[30]​.

Wide-ranging methods (and sources) of scrutiny are put in place by this Committee, some of which can be mentioned. First, on the basis of the reports issued by the government, it asks clarification and evidence (both oral and written) from departments and senior officials; this includes information about specific export licences.​[31]​ Secondly, the Committee considers not only the concerns of civil societies such as Oxfam and the Campaign against Arms Trade (CAAT), but also the arms industry represented by the Defence Manufacturers Association (see Committee Report for 2001, para 63). Thirdly, the Committee consults the work of researchers in shaping the issues.  Finally, it goes without saying that the Committee issues Annual Reports with a range of recommendations on matters of openness and adherence of government to pertinent guiding principles. Questions of openness of government in general and to the Committee (in effect to the public) in particular will now be examined.
   The Report for 2001 (in paragraph 184) underlined that ‘[T]he Government deserves praise for the transparency that it has brought to its operation of strategic export controls’, an assessment on which subsequent Reports concur.​[32]​  However, in the same Report (2001) various concerns of secrecy on arms export had been raised. The first major concern was that the government declined to provide information in confidence to the Committee relying on the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.​[33]​ While the government insisted the Code applies to select committees, the Committee argued that ‘the circumstances under which the Government would refuse to supply information to us are not the same as those under which they would refuse to supply information to the public’ (para. 18). The government seemed to have essentially agreed to their claim, as indicated in the Report (2001).​[34]​  Unlike its practice before the Scott Report (and subsequent years), thus, the government provides the Committee with access to individual licence information ‘in confidence’,​[35]​ following the Report for 2001. But, as the Committee accepted, their access to such information may not be unlimited, if there are explainable strong reasons of a commercial or security nature (Report for 2001, para. 19).   
   As a second problem, as shown in its Report for 2004 and 2005 (which was published in 2006), however, the Committee strongly objected to general responses to its specific policy inquiries such as ‘all licence applications are assessed …against the Consolidated EU Code’.  It was submitted that ‘such answers do not assist the scrutiny of the licensing decisions’, and went on to state that: ‘[W]e are frustrated by the government’s refusal to expose more of its deliberations to us, especially as it supplies commercially sensitive information about end users on request by the Committee’ (para. 49).  
   Thirdly, for the Committee, the issue goes beyond the question of disclosing confidential information to it. The Committee’s Report (for 2004 and 2005) expressed a concern over the increase in use by the government of security classification of documents, so that the Committee would not disclose them to the public (para. 14).  For example, ‘the approval of exports of military equipment to Iraq for the four quarters of 2005’ was marked ‘restricted’ when supplied to the Committee. It challenged this, saying that:

Some of the information we receive to carry out our work is sensitive and we recognise that it has to be supplied under a security classification and that it cannot, and should not, be published. We are, however, concerned by the use of the “In Confidence” designation on material concerning strategic exports which appears to us to blur the line between material which cannot be released because there are strong and clear reasons to withhold it—for example the disclosure of information that would make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness of the security services—from that which is likely to provoke further questions or criticism of policy or particular licensing decisions (para. 15).

The government insisted the validity of considering not only security but also commercial implications of public disclosure. The 2006 response of authorities to the issue claimed:

The Committee will recognise the Government’s responsibility for protectively marking information which could have security and commercial implications should it be released. The application of ‘Restricted’ or ‘Restricted–Commercial’ markings is an indicator to the Committee that onward dissemination by the Committee would go beyond what is permissible in security or commercial terms. In this way the Government allows the Committee to continue to receive the sensitive information needed for its comprehensive scrutiny of strategic exports, while protecting the disclosure of the information (Committee Report 2006,  para 6.).

The issue does not seem to be resolved. What is clear is albeit commercial confidentiality in arms export may be challenged in the interest of democratic controls, in particular parliamentary scrutiny. It is noteworthy, relating to this point, that previous reports recommended that the government assesses ‘the implications of the Freedom of Information Act for what it will be required to disclose about licences, and any implications this may have for the Annual Reports.’​[36]​  The government has not done so;​[37]​ it must, however, be noted that the MoD (and for that matter other departments) carries FoI legislation based (general) disclosure to civil societies and others (the author was among whose who managed to obtain some information).
   As a forth problem, the government’s delay in replying to the requests of the Committee has also been a serious challenge. For instance, the authorities took them over a year to decide on replying to the requests of the Committee regarding the transfer of a radar system to Tanzania (Report for 2001, para. 75).  There were some delays of replies in 2006 as well. It was suggested that ‘the Government agree to reply fully—other than in exceptional circumstances—to our letters on the quarterly reports within six weeks’ (Report for 2004 …, para.12).  The government positively responded saying: ‘we are, as always, committed to answering the Committee’s questions as completely as possible in a timely manner’, as reflected in the same Report.  
   This criticism should not, however, denigrate the commitment of authorities for, and the developments achieved in, timely reporting.  In the words of the Committee:

Licensing data are now published much sooner than before: as the Government promised, the newest information is now three months old and the oldest six months old, compared to six months and 18 months respectively under annual reporting. The Government produced the quarterly reports for 2005 within a reasonable time after the end of each quarter and has made them available on the Internet (Report for 2004.., para. 25). 

The fifth problem was concerning Government sales or gifts of arms to foreign governments and their implication to transparency and accountability. This is because ‘the British Government—does not require an export licence to transfer military equipment abroad.’​[38]​  The Report of the Committee for 2001 affirmed that ‘[T]here is a public interest in knowing to what extent the Government is not only regulating the trade by others in military equipment, but actually participating in that trade itself’. For purposes of fostering transparency and parliamentary checks, therefore, the Committee proposed that future arms sales and gifts should be included in government reports. It is now the practice of the government to include the destination country, type of equipment and quantity of such transactions, as shown in the 2006 Report (para, 20, Tables 2.6, & 2.7), although they are not as detailed as the reports on industry supplies.        
  Finally, Britain does not have a ‘fully searchable and regularly updated database of all licensable decisions’, other than ‘discrete pdf-based copies of three-month chunks of licensing data’, as put by the UK Working Group on Arms.​[39]​  The U.S., for example, provides up-to-date online database on the transfer of surplus weapons to foreign countries.​[40]​ The government agreed (as stated in its response of 2006) to consider it in the long-run, but ‘subject to cost and resource constraints’.​[41]​  
   Hence, these issues among other things exhibited both the progress and the challenges on the process of enhancing transparency and accountability. Why progress? Because the Committee’s access to (secret) information has drastically increased, the government has been willing to change its practices in accordance with Committee recommendations (e.g. reporting on government sales and gifts) and the working relationship between the Committee and authorities seems to be favourable for change and progress. 
  Why challenge? The issues discussed above evidenced the resistance of government to greater openness and parliamentary scrutiny, the slow process of change and the fact that there are outstanding issues (such as classifying documents as secret and its impact on the overall functions of the Committee). Questions of resources (e.g. necessary to develop a database) will continue to arise. But promoting transparency (to the Committee and the public) is just one aspect of the issue which serves as a means to effecting necessary substantive and institutional changes which may eventually lead to a highest level of responsibility and restraint in weapon supplies. 


SUBSTANTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. Some substantive dimensions are considered first. The Committee rigorously undertakes retrospective inquiries into the arms export licence authorisation and their compliance with guiding criteria and policy. The Report for 2001 claimed that ‘the principles embodied in the consolidated criteria (for arms exports) seem to be understood and applied in a sensible way’ (para 182). The Report further concluded that the licenses authorised to most destinations including to Israel, China, Indonesia and Bahrain were flawless (paras 27-49).
   The Report for 2002,​[42]​ moreover, asserted that, in their assessment of each authorised (arms) export license against the criteria, ‘the government has usually been able to satisfy us that the reasons for its decisions were well considered’ (para. 53). During 2002, the government refused 76 export licence applications in consideration of armed conflicts, both internal and inter-state (para. 56); additional 15 applications had been refused due to concerns of national security (para 57). 
  Even so the Committee expressed concern and difficulty ‘to assess whether the government is committed to the sustainable development criterion while it has never been used as a reason for refusing a licence’ (para. 59), and recommended that the government ‘should give further consideration to its interpretation’ of this criterion (para. 60). It also expressed concern and disappointment over the confidentiality of details of refusals including to the Committee (para. 60). The government responded​[43]​ saying that there is no need for further consideration in the field of sustainable development; various economic and social factors have to be considered (para. 10). The second problem (about lack of transparency on refusals) was also simply rejected by saying that we provided adequate information to the Committee as we often do (para. 1). This continued to cause concern for the Committee (as will be considered later relating to the 2007 Report of the Committee),  
   While later reports of the Committee conceded the improvements achieved in the field, they seem to be more critical of the government than previous reports. The  Report for 2004 and 2005 submitted that due to the introduction of the ECA and other subsequent orders ‘most licensing decisions—including many which may superficially seem suspicious— are uncontroversial and properly considered’ (para 205).  However, the Committee strongly questioned the compatibility of arms supplies to Saudi Arabia with (regional and national) human rights criterion. The Report discussed the fact that suppression of fundamental freedoms and executions are widespread in Saudi Arabia, although Britain is continuing supplying conventional weapons to the country.  The Committee, taking into account Saudi’s poor human rights records, ‘recommend that all applications from Saudi Arabia should be considered more carefully’ (para 152).  The government argued that ‘Export licence applications for Saudi Arabia are considered carefully against our human rights criterion’ and that ‘there have been small but significant improvements in the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia’ (2006 Response, para 59). This does not seem to convince either the Committee or civil societies.​[44]​ 
   The Committee’s Report for 2004… was also critical of arms exports to Israel. The Committee questioned a minister and expressed concern over the possibility of an aggressive use of UK supplied weapons ‘in the Occupied Territories’. Officials noted to the Committee that the government refused 84 standard export licence applications to Israel in 2002, a number which had fallen to 13 in 2004. Some of the reasons for this are said to be the circumstances concerning the behaviour of Israeli border police and army or the violence by Hamas or Islamic Jihad. The Committee sought clarification both on the policy and its implementation (paras 156-58).  The response of government to the concern made general reference to the criterion concerning the preservation of peace, security and stability (Government Response of 2006, para 62), without clearly explaining how such exports met relevant  requirements.​[45]​ 
  The most recent Report (of 2007) of the Committee submitted that: ‘[E]xports to a group of countries which include Israel, Saudi Arabia and China Show the lack of transparency in the interpretation of the EU Code on Arms Exports at its most stark’.​[46]​  These and other similar cases often raise questions of compliance of government with its arms trade policies.​[47]​  
    Secondly, the Committee has also been following the bribery allegation arose from the 1980s Al Yamamah arms sales (to Saudi Arabia).​[48]​ While the MoD, in its July 2003 response to the Committee’s inquiry, refuted the allegation, civil societies and journalists accused the MoD for misleading the Committee. The Committee’s Report published in 2006 concluded that due to time constraints it could not address the matter in-depth and it ‘should consider the issue further next session’ (paras 22-4).  The government responded that it is ‘committed to ensuring that bribery plays no part in the activities of UK companies overseas, including those whose business is defence’ (2006, para 11).  The 2007 Report of the Quadripartite Committee dedicated some (long) paragraphs (120—122, and 341-343) which reflect the continued concern and scrutiny of the Committee on the subject, although there is much that is not new.
       This case became more controversial when the SFO, in December 2006, closed an inquiry for reasons of national security. The SFO decision was recently declared illegal by the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court for various constitutional reasons among which were questions of impartiality of its Director and the fact that it was contrary to the rule of law (the criminal justice in particular).​[49]​  It has to be mentioned that the U.S. Department of Justice began an investigation of bribery in relation to BAE, on grounds of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the link between BAE and the country being the payment to Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia made at ‘Riggs Bank at Washington’.​[50]​  
        As motioned earlier however the Quadripartite Committee does not seem to be undertaking serious investigations on this affair (as shown in its 2007 Report). Of course it emphatically thought that the SFO’s action severely damaged ‘the UK’s international reputation’ and efforts of transparency (paras.120-122).  It is not clear whether it can handle such extremely complex cases either. What is clear however is that the BAE-Saudi affair exhibits both the courage and limits of the parliamentary Committee to deal with such intricate investigatory duties, the future handling of which by the Committee is some thing difficult to predict. 
    The institutional dimensions of the Committee’s role can best be explained by few examples. For instance, the Committee warned authorities (especially ministers) not to be involved in the promotion of arms sales (either through the MoD’s sales department (DESO) like institutions or personally). The message was that while ministers may want (or required) to promote the British arms industry, they should not pre-empt license decisions.​[51]​  Those ministers who are involved in arms export controls must therefore dissociate themselves from those institutions which are involved in promoting and marketing the sale of arms.
   In contrast, the July 2005 proposal by the government to fully or partially privatise the Export Control Organisation (ECO) in the future faces fierce opposition from the Committee and interest groups. Its part of the DTI empowered to administer the UK arms sales.  The UK Working Group on Arms outlined the risks if the private sector is involved in the ECO as being ‘confused lines of accountability; institutional and commercial conflicts of interest (real and perceived)…’ (Committee Report for 2004…, paras 51, 52). The Committee reinforced this by saying: ‘the work of the Export Control Organisation is so sensitive and critical to ensuring that strategic exports are effectively regulated’, that it ‘must remain within the public sector under government control. We recommend that the Government endorse this conclusion’ (para 53).  The government recognises (in its 2006 Response) their proposal saying that ‘there are currently no plans to move the work of the ECO outside government control’.  It is indeed difficult to justify the privatisation of such a crucial public department merely on financial and efficiency grounds.
      In brief, the role of the Committee has been vital in promoting openness and responsible arms exports, in accordance with existing legal and policy framework. The reports appear to inform future government decisions on international arms transfer. The government deserves a credit for showing significant commitment in closely working with the Quadripartite Committee and in positively considering many of its suggestions. However, the Committee’s oversight discussed so far has its own limitations which arise, inter alia, from time constraints, complexity and secrecy of transactions, and of course from the absence of pre-export parliamentary scrutiny. 

PRIOR PARLIMENTARY SCRUTNY: reflections. Since its inception, the Quadripartite Committee has insisted that the government should ‘introduce a system for the prior parliamentary scrutiny of export licence applications’ (2001 Report, para. 9); it argued that this would enable parliament to make helpful recommendations before final decisions are made on particular licences.​[52]​  The Report of 2006 moderately stated: ‘a prior scrutiny model for certain sensitive (or precedent-setting) arms export decisions… on a trial basis for transfers to countries under or recently under embargo—should be developed’. 
   Yet the government resolutely rejected this ‘both on practical grounds and as a matter of principle’​[53]​ the details of which is covered in the 2001 reply of the government to the Committee’s Report published during the same year.  In that response, the government said that it is happy to enhance democratic controls through reporting, but strongly felt that it is wrong, in principle, to bring ‘the Committee into the export licensing process, regardless of the formal status of the Committee’s recommendations to ministers, would in practice be bound to blur this (ministerial) responsibility’.​[54]​ And practically, such consultation raises questions of confidentiality, delay and legal difficulties. When disagreement in policy occurs between the Committee and authorities, it would be difficult for the latter to act. 
  However, the Working Group on Arms submitted that ‘while the UK system of parliamentary oversight of UK arms exports is relatively sophisticated compared to most EU partners, its efficacy is weakened by the fact that it is entirely retrospective’.​[55]​  The Group could not see any constitutional confusion, as the government argues, if the Committee’s role (in prior scrutiny) is limited to advisory practices only. 
  It is interesting to note that while Germany, Belgium and Italy have only retrospective parliamentary scrutiny, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.S. have a system of prior notification to their respective legislative bodies (or their committees) on matters of arms transfer.​[56]​  Most of all, the U.S. system

provides for prior notification to Congress (in practice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House International Relations Committee and the House and Senate Appropriations Committee) of all Foreign Military Sales over $7 million planned for the following year; this takes place on or before 1 February each year and the Committee may raise objections to individual contracts which are proposed. In addition, for all sales over $14 million, the Department of Defence has to notify Congress 30 days prior to offering a sales contract to a foreign government; and the State Department has to give the same notice before granting an export licence for arms sales negotiated by a US arms company.​[57]​ 

While this system excludes less than $ 7 million worth arms transactions (which may have serious consequences depending on the circumstances in destinations) from prior legislative scrutiny, it is still a model for openness from which Britain and other democracies could draw some lessons.





Since the Scott Report was published some 12 years ago, major developments have been, recorded, even if slowly, in law, policy and decision making practices on matters of weapon trading. This is particularly true in respect of introducing the ECA and the measures taken to put in place arms export controls. Despite problems of effectiveness, this evolution has been clearly recognised in the 2007 review Report of the Quadripartite Committee (para 1).
  Moreover, the publication of annual and quarterly reports on details of arms transactions and the workings of the Quadripartite Committee and its access to confidential information are indeed significant constitutional developments. The Committee has been essential not only in promoting openness and government accountability to parliament on this subject but also in overseeing government’s compliance with arms export polices. It expressed concerns, proposed caution on certain exports, questioned ministers and others and proposed necessary changes. It was also crucial in overseeing the administration of the arms export licensing system and the institutions involved. Generally, ministers and their departments have been positive in effecting these changes including in responding to concerns and proposals. It is not difficult to see that the Committee’s scrutiny has been informing actual government decisions on arms export authorisation and refusals, although is difficult (due to secrecy) to make conclusive remarks here. In this sense therefore Scott’s concerns over ensuring ‘ministerial accountability’, informing parliament (and its select Committees), and consistency on policy and practice have been tackled to some extent.
   However, twofold challenges exist: On the one had, government’s continuing secrecy (e.g. on refusal details), delay of responses to parliamentary inquiries, and inconsistency on applying crucial principles of arms export (e.g. to the Saudi and Israeli’s arms sales) have been said to be serious challenges for transparent and accountable arms export agenda (Committee 2007 Report, paras. 331 and 48). The same Report expressed disappointment on the fact that the review process did not embrace questions of transparency (para. 369). In this sense, and in spite of the changes it has brought on this field, therefore, the Labour government may have perhaps been part of the secrecy problem, the level of which is not certainly as the same as the Conservative government (of the past). 
  On the other hand, the Quadripartite Committee’s inherent limited powers, resources and access to information are still there. The fact that the Committee’s checks are entirely retroactive adds to these shortcomings. Therefore, the battle to ensuring democratic controls in its full sense and some level of resistance to it in respect of arms exports is continuing, the winner of which will depend on how the battle (if there is any) is fought and many other factors, some of which are the following.
  It has long been argued whether select committees’ should adopt either confrontational or cooperative approaches in their relationship with the government of the day (see e.g. Phythian et al). Confrontation may challenge and compel the executive to comply with principles of democracy and ethical standards, among which are openness and restrain in arms transfer. It may have devastating consequences, too; the working relationship between parliament and the executive may easily be damaged, in particular when authorities are part of, and sympathetic to, some sort of change.  
   Securing cooperation, on the other hand, often leads to building mutual understanding on a range of problems and the way they should be deal with. The danger of close ties (which is the absence of some distance) between SCs and government departments may impact the level and quality of scrutiny on policies and practical flaws. The better approach is therefore to try to strike a balance between cooperation and confrontation. This is what the Quadripartite Committee seems to be essentially doing, especially in recent times. While the strengths and weakness of its reports vary from time-to-time (probably due to the merits and commitments of members of the team), what seems to be consistent is that it confronts, and collaborates with, authorities in conducting its functions. Such a wise approach may substantially (if not absolutely) defuse the tension between the two. The fact that civil societies and experts have constituted part of this parliamentary endeavour provides ammunition to the Committee (and for that matter to the government) in addressing these constitutional, ethical and commercial issues.
  None the less, without the full discharge by ministers of their (constitutional) duties to ensure that parliament (and the Committee) is informed of their policies and actions and that their arms exports are restrained, it is not possible to see the (full) realisation of Scott’s suggestion. As discussed at the beginning of the piece and as shown in the practices of ministers concerning arms exports, ministers are accountable to parliament for their policies and actions (Drewry, 281-302). This is why ministers give detailed answers (in contrast to the practice before Scott) in the floor of the House, publish reports, submit reports to the Committee and appear before the latter to explain their actions and omissions.   
  The question is whether they are indeed, as suggested by Scott, providing ‘as full information as possible’ to parliament and its Committee on questions of the arms trade. It may well be argued to the affirmative: ministers are regularly and consistently informing the Committee about what they think (of their policies) and what they do on arms exports. It is notable that they share confidential information on individual license applications with the Committee. Eve so, the fact that refusal details are not totally unveil to the Committee, there are delays, generality and reluctance to fully explain some inconsistencies in their policy and actions and they are against pre-export authorisation scrutiny would mean that they are not fully complying with what Scott suggested (which was also endorsed in the ministerial Code as considered). The latter argument makes sense owing the relevant promises of the Labour government and their practical limitations; it is also important to consider the practices of other democracies, as will be explained further. Whilst ministers may not be (constitutionally) required to reveal all information in their disposal to the Committee, however, there must be compelling reasons to do so. 
   On the basis of the analysis conducted so far, hence, a small but not insignificant number of suggestions are made below (which may help build up what has been achieved so far).  
   First, concrete and further action of transparency is required in the area of compliance with substantive criteria of arms exports. This means that when allegations (or concerns) of breaking national and international commitments on arms transfers arise, they must be fully explained, at any rate to parliament and its Committee. Transparency on figures and statistics alone does not amount to proper democratic checks on the issue. In respect of very contentious supplies of weapons, the Committee should also go to the extent of requesting full and detailed substantive explanations in confidence.
   Secondly, it is important that the existing transparency and parliamentary framework is reviewed with the purpose of identifying the problems and lessons to be learnt. Particular attention is required to rectifying the challenges arising from the secretive practice on refusal details, delays in, and generality of, government replies to the Committee and the impact of in confidence communications between authorities and the Committee on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of parliamentary endeavours to promote openness and accountability on arms dealings, amongst other things. 
 Thirdly, the system in place only permits post-export scrutiny, so that parliament can take no part in deterring some wrongs before they occur. This increases the risk of blame on government as well as contraventions of principles and procedures. Prior scrutiny is essential especially in some cases the parameters of which have to be debated in various fora. This is so important not only in order to hold officials to account but also in order to share national responsibility with regard to this lethal trade. The US and Swedish parliamentary systems may offer some lessons.  
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